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Intelligence

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Tanzania: Nyerere and Beyond

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An Intelligence Assessment

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ALA 82-10140
November 1982

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An Intelligence Assessment

This assessment was prepared by [redacted] 25X1
a contribution by [redacted] Office of African
and Latin American Analysis. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Southern Africa Division, ALA, [redacted]

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This paper has been coordinated with the
National Intelligence Council and the Directorate
of Operations. [redacted]

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Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 17 August 1982
was used in this report.*

President Julius Nyerere's hold on power is slipping, in our judgment, mainly because he and his government are having increasing difficulty dealing with Tanzania's numerous and deepening economic problems. 25X1 Nyerere also has lost some of the wide popularity he enjoyed during most of the first two decades following Tanzania's independence in 1961. [redacted]

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At the root of the economic muddle is a series of misfortunes and miscalculations that have buffeted the country since the late 1970s. Global recession, high oil import prices, Tanzania's military intervention in Uganda, poor crop years, and frictions with the International Monetary Fund and other aid donors over ill-conceived domestic policies have combined to reduce sharply real economic growth and create substantial current account deficits. There is nothing to suggest that these patterns will be turned around anytime soon. [redacted]

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US Embassy officials in Dar es Salaam [redacted] report that public criticism of Nyerere has become more widespread as these problems mount. Although we have seen no evidence of any organized opposition, discontent is growing among government officials, military personnel, and the general public. Corruption as well as tribal and regional competition—particularly between the mainland and Zanzibar—are also rising as economic conditions worsen. [redacted]

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Despite the challenges Nyerere faces, we believe, [redacted] that the 60-year-old Tanzanian leader is likely to retain power for at least a few more years. We see no other leader around whom power is likely to coalesce, and the military, although disgruntled, appears to have little desire to assume responsibility for the country's many problems. [redacted]

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[redacted] Nyerere does not plan to retire anytime soon. At the same time, however, we believe Nyerere may at some point relinquish the presidency, but retain power as chairman of the ruling Revolutionary Party (Chama Cha Mapinduzi). He would probably select a pliant new President who would continue his socialist domestic programs and nonaligned foreign policy. [redacted]

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Although we assign a low probability to Nyerere's removal from power soon, such an event, in our view, could nonetheless occur in one of the following ways:

- He could be removed by medical problems—even though he appears to be in good health at present—or by assassination.
- A military coup—perhaps led by disgruntled junior officers—could be precipitated by a government attempt to use the military to contain either a local mutiny or civil unrest.

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The first of these two scenarios would be likely to result in a period of intense jockeying for power among politicians representing various tribal and regional groups. In such a situation, the likelihood of military intervention would increase the longer civilian politicians remained unable to reach a consensus on a successor. Because of the paucity of information on political attitudes within the military, we cannot at present predict the composition and policy orientation of a military regime, particularly one led by junior personnel.

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The potential successors to Nyerere whom we have been able to identify would be likely to continue his officially nonaligned foreign policy. At the same time, [redacted] these men share the inclination Nyerere has shown in recent years to side with the West on most East-West questions. A successor regime, in our view, would also be likely to continue Nyerere's cooperative stance toward Western-sponsored negotiations aimed at settling southern African regional issues.

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Whether Nyerere remains in power, we believe Tanzania will become a more inward-looking country as a result of its mounting economic troubles. These problems will increasingly preoccupy the government and limit its ability to continue playing an activist role in regional and international affairs.

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Tanzania: Nyerere and Beyond

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Introduction

Accumulating evidence from [redacted] open sources indicates that Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere's popularity has declined in recent years. Although the 60-year-old Nyerere is still regarded by many foreigners as one of Africa's most talented and intelligent statesmen, he has become the focus of bitter criticism at home as a result of Tanzania's worsening economic troubles. [redacted]

From the standpoint of the United States, Nyerere, although not always supportive of US policy, has played a constructive role on a number of international and regional questions in recent years. For example, he publicly opposed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and supported Western-sponsored negotiations that led to Zimbabwe's independence in 1980. We believe that he will continue to support the West on other key questions such as the Western-led talks on Namibia. Nonetheless, we expect Nyerere—or a successor—increasingly to be preoccupied with the country's domestic problems and less able to continue Tanzania's active and influential role on southern African and other Third World issues. [redacted]

This paper examines the performance of Nyerere's government and his prospects for remaining in office during the next few years. It discusses the implications of his continuation in power—which we consider the most likely scenario over this period—as well as the potential impact of his removal. [redacted]

Nyerere Under Fire

Mounting Economic Troubles¹

Deteriorating economic conditions are the root cause of growing dissatisfaction with Nyerere and his doctrinaire socialist policies among all levels of Tanzanian society. [redacted]



Tanzanian President Nyerere

Tanzanian Daily News ©

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[redacted] The country's economic problems have been long in the making and reflect Tanzania's limited resources and poor government management, as well as external factors beyond the government's control. [redacted]

Barely out of the economic doldrums that beset most of the Third World in the mid-1970s, Tanzania incurred a major new expense during 1978-79 when the government spent some \$500 million, mostly in hard currency, on the military campaign to oust Ugandan dictator Idi Amin. Nyerere expected that Western nations would reward his efforts with fresh economic and military aid, but virtually no added assistance was forthcoming. Tanzania then incurred

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Tanzania's Chronic Economic Woes

Tanzania, which is among the world's leading per capita recipients of foreign aid, is listed by the United Nations as one of the 29 least developed countries, with an annual per capita income of \$260 last year. According to US Embassy and open-source reporting, living standards for most Tanzanians have been falling since the mid-1970s and now appear to be lower than at independence in 1961.

Tanzania's dismal economic situation in part reflects the country's narrow resource base. The main exports are agricultural commodities, which are subject to volatile world market conditions and frequent weather extremes of drought and flood. Moreover, as an oil importer, Tanzania was hard hit by the soaring international oil prices of the 1970s.

Government policies have aggravated the country's problems, according to [redacted] open sources. In 1967 Nyerere launched a development program, called ujamaa, which was designed to mesh socialism and traditional African communalism. The program included extensive nationalizations and a radical plan for rural resettlement.

Although ujamaa did bring some benefits—an increased adult literacy rate and improved social services—it proved highly disruptive to the economy. The extensive economic restructuring required management and planning skills far beyond Tanzania's capabilities. The creation of some 400 state-controlled enterprises, which soon began to dominate the entire economy, created new opportunities for the country's endemic corruption.

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additional costs in maintaining a peacekeeping force of up to 20,000 troops in Uganda for nearly two years. [redacted]

At about the same time, Tanzania suffered from a second round of international oil price hikes that helped drive trade and current account deficits to new highs. Although oil prices have stabilized since the late 1970s, prolonged recession in developed-country markets along with Tanzanian mismanagement have precipitated one financial crisis after another. [redacted]

Tanzanian agriculture also has performed poorly in recent years, according to US Embassy and open-source reporting. Compounding the years of chaos under *ujamaa*, the ill-conceived socialist development program, stringent price controls on food have suppressed output even below the low levels that might have been expected in the face of continuing drought. According to US Embassy reporting, disillusionment with the government's farming schemes has prompted some Tanzanian farmers to leave their communal

plots and return to traditional villages, further disrupting output of cash crops. Others have fled to urban areas, boosting the urbanization rate to among the highest in Africa. Deterioration of the transport and marketing systems, spurred by equipment and parts shortages and poor management, has intensified the impact of production shortfalls. [redacted]

As a result of all these factors, shortages of food and other essentials have become chronic and unemployment and inflation have risen steadily during the past few years. Hard currency shortages, moreover, have recently become acute. Reserves have reached new lows this year, and Dar es Salaam recently failed for the first time to pay for oil deliveries. In addition, most international banks are now refusing to extend new lines of credit to Tanzania because of its failure to repay earlier debts. [redacted]

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Table 1
Key Economic Indicators

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982 ^a
Real GDP growth rate (percent)	5.8	5.5	3.6	2.9	1-2
Rate of inflation (percent)	11.6	13.8	30.2	25.0	35.0
Current account balance (million US \$)	-434.0	-331.0	-589	-751.0	-850.0
Foreign exchange reserves, ^b yearend (million US \$)	92.0	64.0	20.0	17.0	NA
External debt ^c (million US \$)	1,142.0	1,203.0	1,360.07	1,570.0	1,600.0
Debt service ratio (percent)	9.4	8.6	15.4	16.9	NA

^a Projected.^b Excluding Zanzibar.^c Public and publicly guaranteed medium- and long-term debt.

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Recent negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for enough money at least to help pay Tanzania's short-term debts have been acrimonious, according to US Embassy reporting. The Fund's insistence on as much as a 60-percent devaluation, the dismantling of some state-controlled enterprises, and other steep cuts in government spending—especially consumer subsidies—is meeting stubborn resistance. Traditional major donors—including Sweden, the Netherlands, and West Germany—are reported by Embassy sources to be increasingly reluctant to bail out the Tanzanian Government without an IMF agreement. Tanzania's severe financial bind and heavy donor pressure prompted Nyerere grudgingly to implement a 10-percent devaluation in March 1982. He has openly stated, however, that IMF prescriptions for Tanzania are counterproductive because they would worsen shortages of imported producer and consumer goods alike, thereby thwarting attempts to raise output for domestic and export sales and to lower inflation.

Despite Nyerere's statement, according to US Embassy reporting, the country's economic troubles have led the government recently to reconsider the austerity measures required by the IMF. The government has also narrowed the responsibilities of the state-controlled companies, according to the US Embassy, and

recently reinstated cooperative societies, which before they were disbanded in 1976 had functioned along free enterprise lines.

In our judgment, however, these moves will do little to slow Tanzania's economic deterioration in the near term. Real GDP growth in 1982 and 1983 is unlikely to match last year's 2.9 percent, in our view. Shortages of materials and adverse government policies will offset any benefits from good weather in the agricultural sector. Moreover, the combination of expansionary financing of budget deficits, wage increases, and insufficient consumer goods already has lifted inflation this year to an annualized 35 percent, and we believe it will continue to rise.

We believe that domestic producer disincentives and low world prices for Tanzania's major exports will cause export volume and earnings to fall again this year and next. As a result, Tanzania will not have enough foreign exchange to simultaneously import needed foodstuffs and the raw materials and other goods vital to maintaining production.

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Political and Social Impact

The political and social effects of the deteriorating economy are increasingly evident. US Embassy report that some senior officials

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Table 2
Tanzania: Foreign Economic Aid

Million US \$

Tanzania: Economic Comparisons

	1978	1979	1980
Total	526.3	743.6	838.4
Bilateral	402.2	591.5	681.9
United Kingdom	33.6	59.9	141.5
Netherlands	63.4	94.4	88.7
Sweden	64.2	105.2	87.2
West Germany	63.3	87.3	81.3
Norway	30.7	38.7	52.2
Denmark	38.1	50.1	37.1
Japan	23.0	28.6	33.2
Italy	-5.8	27.3	32.1
United States	14.0	22.0	28.0
Other	77.7	78.0	100.6
Multilateral	114.1	152.1	156.5

GDP per Capita, 1981
US \$

Non-OPEC LDC Average	760
Zimbabwe	620
Zambia	560
Kenya	400
Tanzania	260
Zaire	170

Real GDP Growth, 1977-81^a
Percent

Kenya	5.3
Non-OPEC LDC Average	4.8
Tanzania	4.2
Zimbabwe	0.3
Zaire	-0.8
Zambia	-3.0

Adult Literacy, 1977
Percent

Zimbabwe	74
Tanzania	66
Zaire	58
Kenya	50
Non-OPEC LDC Average	48
Zambia	44

Urban Population, 1980
Percent

Zambia	43
Zaire	34
Non-OPEC LDC Average	32
Zimbabwe	23
Kenya	14
Tanzania	12

have criticized Nyerere openly at party or other meetings he has attended. The National Executive Committee² and the Cabinet have recently become the scenes of acrimonious debate over Nyerere's policies on economic and other issues.

According to US Embassy reporting, many of the government's socialist policies have also begun to receive unprecedented scrutiny in Tanzania's 111-man Parliament, which until recently was a rubber-stamp body. Embassy sources report that this stems in part from the fear of many legislators that they will be turned out of office by their constituents during the next round of legislative elections, scheduled for 1985. (In Tanzanian elections voters choose between two candidates from the country's sole political party.) Many members of Parliament were elected for the first time in 1980 on promises to challenge the regime's socialist policies.

² The National Executive Committee is the party's chief executive organ and is responsible for overseeing all defense, security, and economic development activity

Debt Service as a Share
of Exports^b, 1982

Zaire	38.0
Non-OPEC LDC Average	20.0
Zambia	19.0
Tanzania	15.4
Kenya	13.0
Zimbabwe	10.0

Agriculture as a Share
of GDP, 1980

Tanzania	54
Kenya	34
Zaire	33
Non-OPEC LDC Average	28
Zimbabwe	18
Zambia	15

^a Average annual.
^b Excluding arrears.

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An atmosphere of pessimism about the country's future is also spreading outside party and government circles, according to US Embassy reporting. Tanzanians in rural areas have been hurt by a sharp deterioration in social services in recent years, and severe food shortages have occurred in some locations. Discontent with the government was so severe in one area of northern Tanzania last year, [redacted]

[redacted] that Nyerere had to use paramilitary forces to put down a secession movement there. [redacted]

The US Embassy has also detected growing disgruntlement among urban residents. Many urban Tanzanians are said to believe that Nyerere should step down and give someone else a chance to tackle the country's problems. Dissatisfaction among wage earners is especially high, according to the US Embassy, in part because Tanzania's few factories are operating at an average of only 20 to 30 percent of capacity as a result of restrictions on imports. [redacted]

Military and Security Service Attitudes.

[redacted] discontent at all levels of the armed forces over the state of the economy and Nyerere's handling of it is increasing. So far, however,

[redacted] most middle-grade and senior officers recognize that they enjoy job security, status, and perquisites not available to most Tanzanians and therefore remain loyal to the regime. [redacted]

Junior officers and enlisted men are more disgruntled, [redacted] Many have not received promotions or bonuses promised after their return from Uganda. They also miss the lucrative black-marketeering opportunities that were available to them in Uganda. We believe this disenchantment has been aggravated by reductions the government has made in recent years in military spending and in the size of the armed forces. These moves are partly a result of budget cuts made since the end of the military's involvement in Uganda; they are also designed to strengthen government control over the military. [redacted]

[redacted] the Tanzanian Intelligence and Security Service (TISS) has also been affected by the economic crunch. Security personnel are especially disturbed over a recent government decision to reduce expenditures through cutbacks in TISS personnel. [redacted]

Tribal and Regional Rivalries.


[redacted] competition among tribal and regional groupings has been intensified by the worsening economic conditions.³ The powerful "Musoma group"—which includes a number of key officials from Nyerere's home region in northern Tanzania—has been trying to strengthen its position by moving its members into key positions in the government and party against the day when Nyerere is no longer in office. The group centers around Joseph Butiko, Nyerere's nephew and chief adviser (see appendix), and includes the commander of the armed forces, Lt. Gen. David Musuguri, and a number of influential civilian officials. Other tribally and regionally based groups, such as the Hehes from the south and the Chagga from the northeast, are also working to protect their interests. [redacted]

Tribal-regional frictions also appear to be increasing in the military, [redacted]

[redacted] Junior officers from the south reportedly resent the fact that northerners are getting more than their share of promotions and other benefits. Indeed, officers from northern tribes, many from Nyerere's home region, dominate the Army. [redacted]

³ There are some 120 ethnic groups in Tanzania, of which 12 account for about half the population. The largest group, the Sukuma, constitutes about 15 percent of the population. The primary language for interethnic communication is Swahili, the national language. [redacted]

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Underlying all of the country's divisions are the endemic tensions between the mainland and the predominantly Arab, Muslim, politically semiautonomous, and—above all—economically healthier islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. Talk of outright secession has increased recently on the islands, according to US Embassy reporting, and Nyerere's choices—a further loosening of ties or repression—are equally unattractive and risky.

Even though he is blamed for many of Tanzania's problems, [redacted] he still is widely regarded as the only leader able to hold the country together.

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25X1***Corruption.***

[redacted] corruption has reached epidemic proportions in both civilian and military circles and is increasingly resented by ordinary Tanzanians who do not share in its benefits and who see it as making a mockery of Nyerere's Christian socialism. Specific data are lacking, however, as clear evidence of corruption tends to be hidden from the view of foreign observers. In Tanzania, it seems to stem both from economic necessity and from opportunities arising from the large inflow of foreign aid, a constant source of temptation for government officials. With government salaries low and perquisites meager, many Tanzanian officials view embezzlement, misappropriation of funds, forgery of checks, and property theft as necessary to support themselves and their families.

In our view, however, Tanzania's mounting problems are reinforcing Nyerere's frequently voiced desire to step down from the presidency while retaining power as chairman of the party.⁴ Nyerere has taken a number of steps during the past year or so that suggest to us that he may carry out this move some time before the next national elections, scheduled for 1985. Last year he began grooming Edward Sokoine, a prominent Tanzanian with many years of government and party service, as a successor. Nyerere, an intellectual who greatly respects academic training, sent Sokoine to Yugoslavia to complete a master's degree and to give him the opportunity to see firsthand how a successful socialist system works.

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[redacted] senior military officers and civilian officials also smuggle diamonds or coffee to neighboring countries or simply divert government funds for personal use. A government anticorruption campaign last year did little to discourage such activity, according to US Embassy reporting.

Nyerere also began last year to explore ways to strengthen the role of the party vis-a-vis the government, probably to ensure that the party chairman would retain considerable authority.

[redacted] he is seeking to transfer key responsibilities, such as administrative control of the armed forces and the Tanzanian security service, from the government to the party. Such changes would require amending both the party and national constitutions and must be approved by both the National Executive Committee and the Parliament.

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Nyerere Looks Ahead

Despite the seemingly insurmountable problems Nyerere faces and his periodic hints that he may retire, we do not expect him to do so in the near term. Nor are we aware of any politician or grouping actively engaged in schemes to force him from power.

Nyerere has introduced these proposals at various high-level meetings, where they met with considerable opposition, [redacted] Not surprisingly, government officials oppose the transfer of state

* There is a precedent for such a move. Nyerere relinquished the post of prime minister in 1962 and spent most of that year serving only as party chairman. His overwhelming victory in national elections in December 1962 led him to return to the government as the first President of the new Republic of Tanganyika.

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Aboud Jumbe

Tanzanian Daily News ©

*Mainland-Zanzibar Tensions**The Place*

Zanzibar consists of the two coral islands—Zanzibar, 1,657 square kilometers, and Pemba, 984 km². Zanzibar is 35 km and Pemba some 56 km from the mainland. There are about 570,000 islanders—3 percent of Tanzania's some 19 million people. Most residents of Zanzibar and Pemba are Muslims.

Once a dominion of Oman, Zanzibar came under British control in 1890. Although most inhabitants were Africans or Shirazis—descendants of Middle Eastern traders who had married Africans—or a mix of the two, Arabs dominated local politics until independence in 1963. One month after independence, a bloody revolution brought to power an Afro-Shirazi leader, Abeid Karume, who agreed to a political union with mainland Tanganyika in 1964. Karume was assassinated in 1972. His killers were apprehended, but their motives have remained unclear. Aboud Jumbe, another Afro-Shirazi, succeeded Karume as Zanzibari President, at the same time becoming Vice President of Tanzania.

functions to the party. Party officials are also said to harbor doubts; they believe that the proposed changes would keep all essential power in Nyerere's hands without substantially increasing the influence of the party itself.

Because of the opposition Nyerere's proposals have encountered, we believe he has temporarily shelved them. He has also stopped promoting Sokoine's fortunes. US Embassy officials now believe that Nyerere will delay any decision on stepping down from the presidency for at least a few more months. We believe he hopes Tanzania by then will have negotiated a loan agreement with the IMF that would begin to ease the country's economic troubles.

If Nyerere does relinquish the presidency, we believe he would choose a pliant successor. The strong-willed Nyerere would be unwilling, in our view, to share power with an independent-minded official, especially one who might want to dismantle many of his socialist programs. He would be likely to select a replacement who has a solid background in government and party affairs but lacks an independent power base, thereby

In Zanzibar—as on the mainland—the sole political party is the Revolutionary Party. Despite governmental and political bonds with the mainland, the islands retain considerable autonomy in practice. Local affairs are handled by the islands' government under the Zanzibari Revolutionary Council—a 33-man cabinet appointed by Zanzibar's President.

Like the mainland, Zanzibar has a mixed economy, with a substantial nationalized sector as well as considerable private enterprise. The islands' major export crop is cloves, three-fourths of which are grown on Pemba. Cloves account for approximately

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90 percent of Zanzibar's export income, with Indonesia and Singapore the chief customers. Foreign exchange reserves currently amount to about \$60 million.

Some 4,000 Tanzanian military personnel—of whom only 175 are mainlanders—are stationed on Zanzibar. An unknown number of Soviet advisers are present at an SA-3 missile site on Zanzibar Island,

The US Embassy reports that the islanders also resent Dar es Salaam's political dominance. Zanzibaris generally believe that President Jumbe compromised their interests in 1977 by agreeing to integrate their formerly autonomous political party into the mainland's ruling party. According to Embassy reporting, many Zanzibari officials also fear that Nyerere's proposed changes to the national and party constitutions will further consolidate the mainland's political control.

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The Problem

Tanzania's economic woes have complicated the always uneasy relationship between the mainland and Zanzibar. The Tanzanian Government over the years has attempted to bring Zanzibari financial institutions under its control in order to gain access to the Zanzibaris' comparatively healthy foreign exchange reserves. These efforts have been successfully resisted by the islanders, however, and have helped spur them to seek greater autonomy from Dar es Salaam,

The islanders also resent Dar es Salaam's control over foreign aid to the islands, and they object to commercial restrictions that often force Zanzibaris to give priority to trade with the mainland.

Zanzibari efforts to loosen ties with Dar es Salaam stem from longstanding cultural differences as well. Many Zanzibaris, particularly those of Arab descent, pride themselves on being better educated and more sophisticated than the mainlanders. Although almost all Zanzibaris are Muslims, a majority of the mainlanders are Christians—Nyerere is a practicing Roman Catholic—or animists.

[redacted] influential Zanzibaris have actively discussed seeking independence from the mainland, although they have stopped short of making any concerted move toward secession. Several prominent Zanzibari politicians recently have taken a number of steps to dramatize their desire to loosen ties. [redacted] they have drawn up alternative constitutions that would provide for greater autonomy—which appears to be gaining popular support among the Zanzibaris, according to US Embassy [redacted]

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[redacted] although the autonomy campaign has embarrassed the economically beleaguered Nyerere, he has so far moved cautiously to avoid aggravating the traditionally volatile Zanzibaris. We believe, on the basis of US Embassy reporting, that he would like to reach a compromise with the islanders before they press for a complete break with the mainland. Unless he can work out an accord, we believe he will be forced eventually to choose between allowing the island to secede or sending in troops to put down a separatist movement. Either course would seriously tarnish his image both at home and abroad.

ensuring his dependence on Nyerere and adherence to Nyerere's socialist economic programs and non-aligned foreign policy. The most likely candidates, in our view, include Sokoine, Army chief Musuguri, and Minister of State Khigoma Malima (see appendix). [redacted]

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Tanzania Without Nyerere

Death or Decline?

In the unlikely event that medical problems force Nyerere—now in good health, according to US Embassy reporting—to relinquish power, or if he is assassinated, we would anticipate an intense period of political maneuvering, primarily because he has failed to groom a ready successor. We doubt that the Vice President—who, under the constitution, must be a Zanzibari if the President is a mainlander—would assume the presidency other than on an interim basis; mainlanders, who dominate both the party and government, would be unlikely to accept a permanent Zanzibari leader. Although the constitution calls for a single presidential candidate to be selected by the party's National Executive Committee, we believe that a small group of potential candidates would emerge before the Committee convened. These prospective candidates would probably lobby for the support of other influential party officials on the Committee. [redacted]

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Tribal and regional loyalties, would, in our view, figure importantly in such maneuvering. The Musoma and other key groups probably would select "favorite sons" and seek support from various smaller tribal or regional groupings. [redacted]

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We believe that ideological differences would play a less significant role than tribal-regional factors in any succession maneuvering. [redacted] a number of Tanzania's leading politicians now advocate dismantling many of Nyerere's socialist programs. At the same time, we suspect that most politicians would be unwilling to move rapidly in this direction for fear of provoking a backlash from the small but vocal group of government officials who have benefited politically from these programs. [redacted]

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We believe that possible successors to Nyerere if he disappeared suddenly from the scene—as opposed to those Nyerere himself might choose in a personally orchestrated succession—include Tanzanian Ambassador to the United States Paul Bomani, Prime Minister Cleopa Msuya, or Ambassador to Canada Benjamin Mkapa (see appendix). US Embassy reporting indicates that these men, like most Tanzanian officials, support the country's nonaligned foreign policy and share Nyerere's emphasis on supporting the quest for black majority rule in Namibia and South Africa. [redacted]

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A Military Takeover?

US Embassy officials believe that a military coup against Nyerere is unlikely. Several factors so far have dissuaded military men from attempting such a move. [redacted]

Although military personnel have begun to feel the economic pinch that is demoralizing civilians, they continue to enjoy a better standard of living than most civilians. Moreover, as a result of the military's involvement in civilian affairs—all officers are party members and some serve on rotation in government positions—we believe many of them are sensitive to the serious problems facing the country and would hesitate to take on the task of tackling them. [redacted]

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Although we agree that a military coup against Nyerere is improbable, we do not entirely rule it out. Given the dismal economic situation in Tanzania, we can envision a situation in which the military leadership, called upon to put down antigovernment demonstrations or a mutiny by one of its own units, might decide instead to remove Nyerere. That is, military leaders might choose to move against the government

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rather than risk generating wider unrest by intervening against protesters.

A coup by junior officers is also possible. They enjoy relatively few perquisites and have fewer opportunities than senior and middle-grade officers to engage in illegal moneymaking schemes. Their salaries, moreover, are not much higher than those of enlisted men. Junior officers also have meager prospects for advancement in view of the government's current efforts to reduce the military's size and expenditures.

If Nyerere were to leave the scene suddenly, a military takeover would become a much greater possibility, in our view. His departure might coincide with economically inspired civil unrest of such proportions that the military would feel compelled to take over simply to restore order. Even if the situation remained calm, we believe the military might not have enough faith in the constitutional provisions for electing a successor to give the system a chance to function.

In addition, we believe that many officers—especially those at senior levels—might lose patience if civilian politicians were unable quickly to reach a consensus on a successor. A coup would be almost a certainty if senior military officers were dissatisfied with the civilians' choice.

Even if the military refrained from intervening before a new president were elected, we believe it might seize power later on. Its leaders might feel compelled to take over if civil unrest increased under a new president. We doubt that the post-Nyerere leadership would have the ability to contain such unrest without turning to the armed forces—which might ultimately lead to a military takeover. Lack of information on political attitudes within the military makes it impossible at present to predict the exact composition and policy orientation of a military regime, particularly one led by junior officers or enlisted men.

Implications for the United States

Whether Nyerere remains in power, we believe Tanzania will become a more inward-looking country as a result of its mounting economic problems. While Nyerere—or almost any successor—is likely to continue Dar es Salaam's nonaligned foreign policy, we believe Tanzania's severe domestic problems will increasingly preoccupy the government.

We believe that Nyerere will seek to maintain cordial, although not particularly close, ties with the United States. At various times in the past—during the US involvement in Vietnam, for instance—he has been one of Washington's most acerbic critics. Yet, he has frequently expressed admiration for the United States and suspicion of the USSR, according to US Embassy reporting. More concretely, in our judgment Nyerere is likely to continue supporting the West on many key issues. Examples of such cooperation in recent years have included his condemnation at the UN General Assembly of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and his support for the British position during the Falkland Islands crisis.

Nyerere also played a generally constructive role during Western-led negotiations that resulted in Zimbabwe's independence in 1980. More recently, he has tried to be helpful in the Western-sponsored negotiations on independence for Namibia. His longstanding strong support for black nationalist groups together with the force of his personality and intellect have enabled him to wield considerable influence among the Frontline presidents on both the Zimbabwe and Namibia questions.

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We believe, however, that Nyerere's influence in the Namibia negotiations is likely to wane if the issue drags on much longer. Domestic troubles almost certainly will occupy an increasing amount of his time and energy and reduce his ability to focus on Namibia. If Nyerere were removed from power, we believe that any successor would be unlikely to play as active and influential a role on Namibia as he has.

With or without Nyerere, we believe that the government's willingness to provide military aid to its neighbors is likely to decrease as Tanzania's domestic problems continue to mount.

Nyerere in the past had been willing to overlook the financial costs in granting military aid to various African and Indian Ocean countries because he attaches great value to his regional and international role.⁵

Just as Tanzania's role as a non-Communist source of military aid is likely to diminish as Nyerere—or a successor—becomes increasingly preoccupied with problems at home, so too, in our view, may its broader efforts to curtail Soviet influence in southern and eastern Africa. Nyerere up to now has made an active effort to prevent an increased Soviet Bloc presence in the region. [redacted] he has cautioned such leaders as Mozambican President Machel and Seychelles President Rene against expanding their ties with Moscow.

Finally, we believe that if Nyerere's hold on power slips further or if he departs the scene suddenly and unrest ensues, this could have a destabilizing impact on neighboring countries. For Zambia and Burundi, for example, instability in Tanzania could disrupt economically important transportation links through Tanzania that connect these two landlocked countries with the Indian Ocean. Finally, a military takeover in Tanzania could have a "demonstration effect" in other countries—particularly in Kenya and Seychelles, both the scene of recent military coup attempts, and in Mozambique, where the government has been unable to defeat South African-backed insurgents.

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⁵ Tanzania in the past has provided military advisers, combat troops, or materiel to Zimbabwe, Uganda, Mozambique, Seychelles, and Comoros. African leaders have turned to Nyerere for military aid because his 45,000-man Army is widely viewed as the best military force in black Africa. Comprised largely of troops from northern tribal groups that are known for their military prowess, the Tanzanian military is tightly organized and well trained by African standards.

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Appendix

Potential Successors to Nyerere⁶

Edward Sokoine

Former Prime Minister. Although often mentioned by senior government officials as the most likely successor if Nyerere relinquished the presidency, [redacted] Consequently, we believe he would be unlikely to stand as a presidential candidate unless Nyerere were still on the scene and backed him. [redacted]

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If he became president, Sokoine probably would continue Nyerere's main domestic and foreign policies. As a result of his country upbringing in north-central Tanzania, he maintains a strong interest in promoting the welfare of rural Tanzanians. He also appears favorably disposed toward the United States and is openly friendly to US officials. [redacted]

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Sokoine, 43, was born in Monduli, Arusha Region. He is a member of the nomadic Masai ethnic group and received most of his education in Tanzania. He has held a variety of senior government and party posts. He became Minister of Defense in 1972 and held that position until he was named Prime Minister in 1977. Sokoine resigned as Prime Minister in 1980 because of a diabetic condition, which now appears to be under control. [redacted]

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Lt. Gen. David Musuguri

Commander of the Tanzanian People's Defense Force. Musuguri enjoys close ties to Nyerere—he is a distant relative of the President—and is popular among the troops. According to US Embassy officials, he has little formal education, lacks strong political views or ambitions, and is generally regarded as a poor administrator. Although we believe Musuguri would be unlikely to initiate a coup against the President, he might take such action to preempt a similar move by other elements in the military. Nyerere might select Musuguri to assume the presidency if he believed it necessary to appease disgruntled military officers. [redacted]

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If Musuguri came to power, we believe that in foreign and domestic policy questions he probably would rely heavily on the advice of civilian officials from the Musoma group—of which he is a member. These officials would probably favor an increased emphasis on free enterprise and a continuation of Tanzania's nonaligned foreign policy line. [redacted]

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Musuguri, 57, is from Musoma and—like Nyerere—is a member of the Zanaki ethnic group. He has a primary school education and has received some military training prior to independence in the King's African Rifles. [redacted]

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⁶ These sketches are based on US Embassy and open-source reporting. [redacted]

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Kighoma Malima

Minister of State in the Vice President's Office for Planning and Economic Affairs. A leading radical and a principal theoretician of Tanzanian socialism, Malima has worked closely with Nyerere for years. Well educated and bright, he harbors leadership ambitions and is close to many influential party members, according to the US Embassy. These links, along with his ideological orientation, could lead Nyerere to begin grooming him to assume the presidency. [REDACTED]

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As an ardent advocate of *ujamaa* socialism, Malima has consistently urged Nyerere to strengthen rather than reduce the government's role in the economy. If he took office as president, we believe he would pursue Nyerere's socialist policies even at the cost of antagonizing the International Monetary Fund and other Western aid donors. Malima probably would maintain a nonaligned foreign policy, although he might adopt a less friendly stance than Nyerere has toward the West. The US Embassy has described his attitude toward the United States as ambivalent; he is highly critical of many aspects of the US social and economic system but favorably impressed by the US academic system [REDACTED]

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Malima, 43, is believed to be a member of the Zaramo ethnic group. He is from Marui, just south of Dar es Salaam. Malima attended Dartmouth and Yale, and earned a Ph.D. in economics at Princeton. He has served in the UN Development Program and has headed the Economics Department at the University of Dar es Salaam. He was appointed to his current position in 1980 [REDACTED]

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Paul Bomani

Ambassador to the United States. Of the men usually mentioned as possible successors to Nyerere, Bomani is the only one with a solid political base of his own. He enjoys strong backing from various tribes in and near his home region of Musoma. At the same time, he apparently is viewed by many Tanzanians as a man who would transcend tribal lines if he came to power. [REDACTED]

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Bomani is a competent administrator and wealthy businessman who helped finance Nyerere's preindependence political activities. He remains one of the President's closest friends and allies. His absence from Tanzania since 1972, however, could make it difficult for him to come to power. [REDACTED]

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A conservative capitalist, Bomani almost certainly would introduce policies favoring free enterprise if he came to power. He probably would also encourage a special relationship with the United States. [REDACTED]

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Bomani, 57, is a member of the Sukuma, Tanzania's largest ethnic group. He was educated in Tanzania before earning an M.A. in International Public Policy in 1976 at Johns Hopkins University. Before his assignment to the United States, Bomani had served in every cabinet since independence. He has held the portfolios of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Finance, Economic Affairs and Development Planning, and Commerce and Industry. [REDACTED]

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Secret**Cleopa Msuya**

Prime Minister. When he was appointed Prime Minister in 1980, Msuya was widely believed to have little political backbone and was expected to toe Nyerere's line. According to US Embassy sources, the capable and hard-working Msuya subsequently surprised many Cabinet members—and irritated Nyerere—by his independent and sometimes abrasive attitude toward the President. Msuya, according to these sources, retains the respect of most bureaucrats and civil servants who admire his commitment to getting things done [redacted]

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Msuya has told US Embassy officials that he believes both the state and the private sector have a role to play in Tanzania's economy, but that private investment should be emphasized. He has also expressed these views to Nyerere, according to US Embassy officials, and we believe that if he assumed power he would take steps to soften Tanzania's socialist system. It is our view that Msuya would generally follow Nyerere's nonaligned foreign policy and that he would probably work to strengthen ties with the West. [redacted]

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Msuya, 51, is from Kilimanjaro Region in northern Tanzania. He is a member of the Meru ethnic group. Msuya graduated from Makerere University before joining the government in 1956. He served in various positions in the civil service before being named Finance Minister in 1972. He subsequently served as Minister of Industries and as Director of the National Bank of Commerce before becoming Prime Minister. [redacted]

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Benjamin Mkapa

Ambassador to Canada. Mkapa is an articulate diplomat whose strongest asset in any post-Nyerere struggle, according to reporting from US Embassy sources, would be the considerable respect and popularity he enjoys among senior government and party officials because of his candid criticism of Nyerere's socialist policies. He lacks an independent power base, however, and might have difficulty gaining the necessary support to run for president. [redacted]

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Mkapa has been a leader among moderate government and party officials in debates against hardline socialists, such as Kighoma Malima, on the regime's economic policy line. If he became president, we believe he would try to undo many of Nyerere's economic programs and seek greater Western trade and investment. [redacted]

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Although critical of some US policies, Mkapa has been described by US Embassy officials in the past as one of the most pro-US members of the Cabinet. We believe he would maintain Nyerere's nonaligned foreign policy and might try to emulate Nyerere's leadership role in regional issues. Mkapa was involved in the negotiations leading to independence for Zimbabwe. [redacted]

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Mkapa, 43, is from Masasi, Mtwara Region, in southeastern Tanzania and is a member of the Makua tribe. He attended college in Tanzania and subsequently studied at Columbia University's Institute of International Relations (1962-63). He studied journalism in the United Kingdom during 1965-66. Mkapa has served as editor of several of Tanzania's newspapers and has been Nyerere's press

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secretary. He has also served as High Commissioner to Nigeria and Ghana and was Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1977 to 1980. He then was Minister of Information and Culture until his appointment as Ambassador to Canada earlier this year. [redacted]

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Joseph Butiko

Personal Assistant to the President. Widely viewed as the second most powerful man in Tanzania, Butiko is believed to have the complete confidence of President Nyerere, his uncle. Although we believe that Butiko would be unlikely to be a contender for the presidency—[redacted]—he is in a position to play an influential role in any succession to Nyerere. He has close links with the security service and the military [redacted]. He is clever and ambitious yet aware of his shortcomings. We believe Butiko could be especially helpful to any politician seeking power from his home region of Musoma; he is a key member of the Musoma Group. [redacted]

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In the unlikely event Butiko did take power, we believe he would dismantle many of Nyerere's socialist economic programs and introduce measures to promote a capitalist economy. Although he has indicated to US officials that he was favorably impressed by the United States during a visit in 1977, he is described by some US Embassy officials as no friend of Washington. We believe he probably would pursue a nonaligned foreign policy line. [redacted]

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Butiko, 44, is a member of Nyerere's Zanaki ethnic group and has received some security training in Israel. [redacted]

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